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P

olluted water. Humcanes. Shipwrecks. Drowning sailors.
Land developers. Cheap transportation. U.S. presidents willing to invest federal funds in order to court Florida voters.
Presidential advisors who attempt to clear the minefields of conflicting local interests in order to implement presidential policy. Public
expectation that powerful congressional leaders will bring home
the bacon. The ever escalating tension between economic develop
ers/civic boosters on one hand and environmentalists on the other.
Typical Florida boondoggles and screwups. If the cast of characters
and issues sounds familiar, it is because few patterns of human conduct are entirely new, nor are our current debates entirely foreign
to our collective history.
I could begin this story in the sixteenth, nineteenth, or twentieth centuries. Each point of origin conveys its own context and
meaning. The argument for the sixteenth century is in some ways
the simplest and purest. In the 1570s Pedro Menendez de Aviles,
designated "Captain General of the Westn by Spanish King Phillip
11, thought a canal from the Gulf to the Atlantic would assist Spain's
conquest of America. So in its earliest manifestation, the dream of
a cross-Florida canal was a geo-strategic effort conceived amidst
great power rivalries.
Wayne Flynt is Professor Emeritus in the Department of History at Auburn
University. A Ph.D. from Florida State University, he is the author of many books
on southern culture, religion and rural poverty. He is a past president of the
Southern Historical Association.
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Two and a half centuries later, the first Florida territorial governments considered canals the best solution to inland transportstion problems. Navigating the Florida Straits was no simple matter.
Sudden storms, barrier islands, reefs, and pirates played havoc with
maritime routes along the Gulf of Mexico, in the waters off Cuba,
and up the Atlantic coast. In 1822 Secretary of War John C.
Calhoun dispatched army engineers to study the possibilities of
building a canal between the Saint Maqs and Suwannee Rivers.
Congress authorized such a survey in March 1826, and Brigadier
General Simon Bernard (once Napoleon's principal military engineer) completed the project in 1829. He concluded that the idea
was flawed because Florida's west coast had no deep water harbor
between Tampa and Apalachee Bay. His report did suggest an
alternative route from the SaintJohns River via Black Creek to the
Santa Fe, thence to St. Marks. This vision of a cross-Florida canal
captured the imagination of prominent planters, businessmen, and
politicians. In fact, it may have been the first sustained develop
ment scheme in Florida history, enlisting many of the state's movers
and shakers on various canal boards. At a cost of only $10,400 far
the survey, Congress survived this first contagion of canal fever on
the cheap, which was a good thing since railroad mania soon
eclipsed canal building as the crusade du jour.'
Over the next century, the envisioned route for a crossFlorida
canal remained a land of primitive grandeur, Florida as the
Seminoles had first beheld it. Northerners also came to treasure
the terrain between the St. Johns and Ocklawaha Rivers as a welcome relief from northeastern congestion and rapacious develop
ment. A Vermonter, Hubbard Hart, came South before the Civil
War and following the conflict, was instrumental in developing
tourism on the majestic, meandering, treecanopied Ocklawaha
(1870s-1920s). Boats transported northern tourists as well as commerce and rafts of cypress logs across these remote inland waters.
In 1878 entrepreneur HullamJones built a glass viewing box on the
bottom of a dugout canoe and allowed Ocklawaha tourists to glide
over the clear waters of Silver Sprinffjlocated at the end of the river.
At first, natural beauty was its own reward. But the emergence
of a Barnum and Bailey world required something perpetually new.
And the zany 1920s required ever greater exertions to maintain
1.

'

Charlton W. Tebeau, A History of & d a (Coral Gables: University of Miami
Press, 1971), pp. 34-38,142.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol87/iss1/3

2

Flynt: The Cross-Florida Canal and the Politics of Interest-Group Democr

3
interest in canal country. Silver Springs added to its glass-bottomed
boats a man who milked rattlesnakes, plus monkeys, a trolley, and
a deer ranch which featured a section inexplicably called "Santa's
South Pole." Johnny Weismuller made Tarzan movies, and in time
pretty girls in swimsuits skied across the pristine waters of the
Spring. Palatka, an old St. Johns River town,could not be content
with one title. So claimed three: the "Gem City of the St. Johns";
the "Bass Capital of the World"; and the "Official Mural City of
North East Florida" (actually there wasn't much competition for
the latter title).
Yankeetown on the western end of the future canal began with
the immigration of folks from Indiana who named their settlement
Knotts, after themselves. But the local mail carrier, an unreconstructed Confederate still smarting over the outcome of the Civil
War, preferred to designate the place by the origin of the newcomers rather than by their family name, insisting on calling it
Yankeetown. The Hoosiers retaliated later by calling one of the
tom's subdivisions "crackertown."
Inglis, at the far Gulf end of the canal route on State Road 40,
later became famous when Elvis Presley made a movie in the vicinity. A mayor some years afterwards also banned Satan from the city
limits, although it is uncertain whether or not the presence of Satan
was a residual effect of the hip-twisting popular music icon.
Enshrining both the celluloid dreams of Hollywood and the enduring vision of cross-Florida canal enthusiasts, a stretch of State Road
40 was named "Follow That Dream ark way."^
If all this sounds a bit theatrical, remember that marketing
Florida had become the consuming passion of many boosters by
the 1920s. The canal idea was resurrected in the frenzied context
of George Menick, who built Coral Gables and the American
Riviera, where real estate agents promoted "Manhattan Estates"
near "the prosperous and fast-growing city of Nettie," which turned
out for buyers wary enough to investigate before signing a check to
be an abandoned turpentine camp.
CROSS-FLORIDA
CANAL

,

2. For a clever spoof of "canalland" U.S.A., see Diane Roberts, uAboondoggle's
wake," The St. P h ' g Times,January 11, 2004. For excellent studies of the

'. I canal, see Sally Rowe Middleton, "Cutting Through Paradise: A Political
History of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal," Ph.D. dissertation, Florida
International University, 4001; and the forthcoming book from the University
of Florida Press by Steven N d and David Tegeder, Ditch of Dreams: The CrossF b d u Barge C a d a d the FWJbrM ' s Future.
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As marketing abuses became better known in the Northeast, an
active anti-Florida press developed, and Gov. John W. Martin led a
contingent of state business leaders to New York City's Waldorf
Astoria Hotel in 1926 for a "Truth About Florida" meeting.
Unfortunately, not all the anti-Florida stories were untruthful.
Overbuilt, underfunded, over-promoted, and uncritical, the
"Florida boom" collapsed in 1926 like the proverbial stack of cards.
During July 1926, 117 banks in Florida and Georgia failed; 150
closed their doors by end of year. Between 1926 and 1929 Florida
bank assets declined by sixty percent. The banking collapse d e n s
tated the state's economy and plunged Florida into depression.
As if in divine retribution for the prefhbrication, hyperbole, exaggeration, and outright lies of its promoters, a fierce hurricane struck
Miami on September 19, 1926 (the first major direct hit on the
peninsula since 1910). What warnings newcomers received, they
largely ignored, with the result that nearly 400 died, 6,300 were
injured, and nearly 18,000fimdies lost their homes. Two years later,
on the night of September 16, another hunicane with gusts up to 130
miles an hour plowed into Palm Beach before moving inland, killing
as many as 3,000 mainly black workers engaged in seasonal labor
along Lake Okeechobee (an event that became the climactic setting
for Zom Neale Hurston's searing novel Thkr eye^ W m Watching God).
By November 1933,85,000 Floridians were hunting work?
If you travel to Hyde Park, New York, you can read about those
years that the locusts claimed in the clergy files at the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library. Responding to a September 1935 invitation
from the president asking them to describe conditions in Florida at
the time, ministers related a tale of human tragedy and woe that was
Jobian in scale. The pastor of Live Oak Presbyterian Church
described the temble saering among Suwannee County sharecroppers. A Methodist minister in Madison, whose circuit consisted mainly of poor people, complained that many of the hardest hit
could obtain no help from New Deal agencies. Many clergymen
praised the Townsend Plan for old age pensions while criticizing
the New Deal from left of center, arguing that Roosevelt had done
little to mitigate the effects of the Depre~sion.~
3.
4.

Tebeau, pp. 386-388.
Rev. Laurence Williams to FDR, October 21, 1935; Rev. D.L. Jones to FDR,
October 9, 1935; Box 6, PPF 21A, Florida, Clergy Letters, Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library and Archives, Hyde Park, New York. These are represen-
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Stung by such criticisms and fearing a full scale revolt against
him in the fall of 1936 led by Louisiana's demagogic U.S. Senator
Huey Long, Roosevelt scurried to shore up his left flank.
Implementing the so-called Second New Deal, Roosevelt
moved quickly toward three main goals: improved economic
opportunity through the better use of national resources; security
against unemployment, old age, illness, and dependency; and slum
clearance and improved housing. A flurry of New Deal legislation
gave shape to these objectives, including transformation of the Civil
Works Emergency Relief Act into the Works Progress
Administration (WPA).
In Florida's senior U.S. Senator Duncan U. Fletcher, Roosevelt
found a faithful ally to implement his agenda. Having always tacked
his sails to the prevailing winds of Florida politics, Fletcher had first
risen to prominence as part of Napoleon Bonaparte Broward's progressive Democratic faction in Jacksonville. But after his election to
the U.S. Senate in 1908, he followed Florida's political currents to
the right during the teens and early 1920s. Then the state's economic collapse sent him moving back in the direction of his origins.
Roosevelt carefully cultivated Fletcher in the runup to the 1932
presidential election, with the result that Fletcher broke with conservative Florida Democrats desperately seeking an alternative to
the liberal New York governor. The newly elected president summoned Fletcher to a conference in January 1933 and persuaded
him to forego the chairmanship of the Senate Commerce
Committee in favor of a similar post as head of the powerful Senate
Banking and Currency Committee. Already planning an assault on
Wall Street and America's banking industly that would eventuate in
the most sweeping financial reforms in U.S. history -the Banking
Act of 1933, the Securities Act of 1934 ("Truth in Securities" Act);
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Fletcher-Raybum Actn);the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935; the Banking Act of
1935 - Roosevelt needed the services of the shrewd, meticulous
Floridian in order to outmaneuver conservative Virginia Senator
Carter Glass and insure a majority on the committee favorable to
the president.
tative of dozens of other letters (see especially letters critical of the New Deal
for doing too little from Rev. H.W. Blackshear of Ocda, October 19, 1935;
Rev. T.O. Barber of Fletcher, October 9,1935; Rev. W.C. Sale of Jacksonville,
September 27, 1935; Rev. L.R. Anderson of Crystal River, October 7, 1935;
Rev. L.M. Reid of Waukeenah, September 30,1935; @.kt.)
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If Fletcher had something the president needed, the president
was in a position to reciprocate. Through the WPA and other relief
agencies, Roosevelt could put tens of thousands of Floridians to
work. And Fletcher had just the project in mind on which to
employ them.
Since early in his senatorial career, Fletcher had been a propnent of a cross-Florida ship canal. Jacksonville area businessmen,
farmers, and civic boosters had long claimed that water transportation permitted cheaper movement of projects than did monopolistic railroads. The Mississippi to Atlantic Inland Waterway
Association had met at Columbus, Georgia in 1908, the year
Fletcher was elected to the senate. Its leaders planned an inland
route from the Mississippi River to the mouth of the Appalachicola
River, thence east across the peninsula to Jacksonville. Delegates
elected Fletcher president of the Association, and he responded to
the honor with a substantial donation to the cause. Fletcher envisioned the canal as a way to shave 1,000 miles off U.S.-Latin
American trade routes, opening lucrative markets by reducing
transportation costs.5 A 107 mile long, 30 foot deep ship canal for
oceangoing vessels would make Ocala the largest inland port in
America. The canal he envisioned would be twice as large as the
Suez and four times larger than the Panama Canal.
During his long career, no U.S. senator was more effective in
passing local river and harbor bills than Fletcher. Florida possessed
the nation's longest coast line, and most of its population lived in
Attantic or Gulf port cities or along inland riven. Fletcher thoroughly understood the possibilities that this fortuitous geography
afforded him. During the SixtySecond Congress, he guided
through two million dollars for Florida projects; the March 1913
Rivers and Harbors Bill contained $800,000for work on the St.
Johns, Indian, Clystal, Withlacoochee, Caloosahatchee, and Boca
Grande Rivers, as well as expenditures for harbors in Key West,
Sarasota, and Tampa. Before facing reelection in 1914, Fletcher
won an appropriation of $730,000 for a trans-Florida canaL6
Shortly after FDR took office in March 1933,water projects also
played a pivotal role in Florida's bitter 1934 senatorial primary
5.

6.

D.U. Fletcher to N.B. Broward, September 14, 1909, pamphlet in Napoleon
B. Broward Papers, P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of
Florida.
Jacksonville J h i d u Times-Ummolr,
March 3, 1913.
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between challenger Claude Pepper and incumbent Park Trammell.
Jacksonville's boosters pushed both aspirants to endorse the crossFlorida canal. When Trammeil hesitated, they endorsed Pepper.
Fletcher, who never cared much for Trammell personally or
worked closely with him in the senate, assured Pepper of his neutrality in the race, assurance that Pepper used to good effect in
order to undermine Trammell. So concerned did Trammell's
organized labor backers become that they lobbied Fletcher furiously to endorse his junior colleague. Fletcher reluctantly responded
with an innocuous endorsement hedged with qualifications and
urging Florida voters to decide for themselves whom to support7
However tepid and unenthusiastic his endorsement, it probably
made the difference in Tramme1l's paper-thin 4,000 vote victory
margin.
Obsessed with putting people to work, Fletcher countered a
gradual reduction in New Deal reliefjobs by proposing a quasi-permanent Public Works Administration funded for five years at halfa-billion dollars, with the cross-Florida canal a major beneficiary of
this federal largesse.
By 1933 the government had conducted no less than 28 engineering surveys of possible routes. But the Public Works
Administration had rejected the proposed cost of the canal, which
engineers estimated at $208 million. Fletcher aqd his allies persuaded FDR to conduct one additional survey which miraculously
reduced the estimated cost to a manageable $146 million!
If the first vision of a canal was born in global geepolitical
power struggles, the second in concern for the safety of mariners,
ship, and their cargoes, and the third in civic boosterism /economic development, this newest attempt mainly involved Depressionerajob creation. Ironically, the fateful decision finally to launch the
canal project occurred at a time when train and truck transportation had largely eclipsed maritime commerce.
The president's decision, popular as it was with Fletcher and
north Florida canal proponents, met withering criticism in both
populous south Florida and Washington, D.C. The U.S. Geological
Sumey reported that a sea-level canal would create serious prob7.
8.

Eli Futch to Joe,June 11, 1934, R.L. Glenn to Duncan U. Fletcher, June 11,
1934, Park Trammeil Papers, P.K. Yonge Library, +.cia
Benjamin F. Rogers, "The Florida Ship Canal Project," P b d c z Histinid
Q
u
u
w
,X X J M (July 1957), 1423.
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lems for south Florida's fresh water supply by cutting through the
southern sloping aquifers. In late August, 1935, the Associated
Citrus Growers and Shippers condemned the project. Roosevelt at
first dismissed these objections and under prodding from Fletcher
appropriated five million dollars of federal relief funds on August
30 to begin digging. Enthusiastic north Florida residents credited
Fletcher with success when excavation began that September.
Within months, an army of 6,000 workers assaulted the land, knocking down ancient live oaks, ripping out palmetto, displacing 16,000
cubic yards of soil, and clearing 4,000 acres.
Unfortunately for Fletcher, the state's most formidable canal
foe resided in the U.S. Capital. Secretary of Interior Harold L.
Ickes was a Pennsylvania-born progressive Republican who had
entered national politics as a disciple of Theodore Roosevelt and
the environmental-friendlyBull Moose Party. Disillusioned by the
Republican administrations of the 19209, Ickes cast his lot with FDR
in 1932. During his term of office, Ickes not only sided frequently
with environmentalists within Interior, he also filled one hundred
volumes of closely typed copy - a total of approximately six million words - of a truly secret diary. Few knew of its existence and
virtually no one saw other than selected entries. The diaries furnish
an unparalleled, uncensored account of interior matters and
debates within the New Deal comparable to a paper version of the
infamous Niion audio tapes.
One major index entry in the published diaries concerns the
"trans-Florida canal." The first entry occurred on December 19,
1935, three and a half months after Roosevelt released relief money
to begin construction. Convinced that Congress would make no
additional significant appropriations to the WPA, Ickes informed
the president that his greatest anxiety about relief projects concerned the Florida canal. Ickes noted in his diary that for the first
time Roosevelt carehlly listened to his objections, perhaps signaling that the president was having second thoughts. Ickes repeated
the opposition of geologists that the canal might contaminate the
state's fresh water supply. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
president vowed to transfer the entire matter to Congress and let
that body make the decision and take the heat.g

9.

Harold L. Ickes, The Serret Diav of Harold 1;. I c k : The First Thousand Days,
1933-1936 (NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 1953), pp. 488489.
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On a visit to Miami a month later, Ickes met with the owner of
the Miami Hoald who lobbied against the canal and announced
that he planned to take his case to Washington. Conveying to Ickes
that Floridians south of the canal bitterly opposed the project, he
prodded the secretary to reveal that though he could not publicly
oppose the canal because of Roosevelt's position, he privately
agreed entirely with opponents. Another south Florida Democrat
confided to New Deal administrator Steve Early that local party stalwarts were "sore as boiled owls."1°
Three days later back in the capital, Ickes was cornered by
Roosevelt about cost overruns on relief projects. Ickes confided
that he always kept his "fingers crossed with respect to . . b y engineers" estimates, adding that he particularly doubted their computations on the Florida canal, which he described as "~ockeyed."~~
On March 3, 1936, the president related to Ickes a "brainstorm" that he had worked out as a way to "let go of the bear's tail."
Ickes congratulated Roosevelt on finally recognizing that the ship
canal was a "bear's tail" and that he was willing to let it go. But the
president clarified that he planned to build a barge canal with locks
over the highest section of' land that would otherwise require a
deep cut A disappointed 1ckescautioned the president not to commit to even this modification. Instead the president should suggest
that building locks was merely a possibility based upon "a careful
study of its geologic and economic effects." Ickes concluded his
diary entries about the canal with a cryptic postscript "This is certainly one bad mess that the President rushed into over my
protests."12
The president, following up on his "brainstorm," wrote
Fletcher that future action on the canal would have to originate in
Congress. The senator tried unsuccessfully to reverse Roosevelt's
decision or at least win his active support for a congressional appre
priation. In February he warned that it would take Roosevelt's
"every effort" to move the bill through Congress and predicted that
without additional funds, 800 to 1,000 men would be laid off.
Powerful Jacksonville Democrats contested the arguments of their
south Florida counterparts, warning of a %cry bad political effect"
10. W.,
p. 502; Dudley V. Haddock to Steve Early, February 14, 1936, OF 300,
Roosevelt Papers,
11. Ickes, p. 514,
Ed., p. 541.
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if the president deserted the canal project. Rumors even circulated in Florida that the president refused to confer with Fletcher
about the canal. Under pressure from north Floridians, Fletcher,
and even the liberal N m Rkpublic, which had endorsed the canal,
Roosevelt wavered, allocating an additional $200,000 from relief
funds to extend the project temporarily. But he vowed to end canal
work in the absence of congressional appropriations.13
Fletcher lumped a $29 million canal appropriation with four
other scattered waterway projects designed to cobble together a
package with maximum political leverage. To make the case even
stronger, he tied the package to the War Department's appropriations bill. Roosevelt - pressured on one side by Fletcher, north
Florida Democrats, and Fletcher's southern congressional allies,
and on the other side by Ickes, congressional Republicans, and
south Florida Democrats - opted for caution. Refking to intervene either way with proceedings, Roosevelt watched the subcommittee reject the canal bill by a 6 to 5 vote. Fletcher took his case
to the full committee where he lost 12 to 11. Before the senate, the
bill failed 39 to 34. Upon reconsideration, the bill lost again, 36 to
35 when critically ill Park Trammel1 could nottattend (but for his'
4,000 vote loss in 1934, Claude Pepper would no doubt have furnished the tying vote, which vice president John Nance Gardner
probably would have broken in favor of the bill). Roosevelt, under
unrelenting pressure fiom Fletcher, finally intervened in late May,
pushing the measure through the senate 35 to 30."
Neither Fletcher nor Trammell lived to see the canal project
collapse. Exhausted by two years of nearly constant banking committee hearings, added to the enervating efforts necessary to keep
the canal alive, Fletcher died of a heart attack on June 17, 1936, a
month and nine days after the death of his colleague Park
Trammell.
The following day, June 18, the House of
Representatives paid mock homage to the Florida senaton by

1

Mmurandztm, January 1, 1936, PPF 1358, in Roosevelt Papers; Duncan U.
Fletcher to Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 19,1936 and December 23,1935;
Mnno~-andumto James Farley from Harllee Branch, March 5,1936, OF 635, in
Roosevelt Papers; Harry Hopkins to Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 31,1936;
Mmurandum for James k Farley, March 20, 1936, OF 635, in Roosevelt

Papers.
14. Duncan U. Fletcher to Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 27, 1936, OF 635;
Memurandurn from Marvin H . McIntyre, Februa'y 10, 1936, OF 635; in
Roosevelt Papers.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol87/iss1/3

10

Flynt: The Cross-Florida Canal and the Politics of Interest-Group Democr

killing the ship canal on a vote of 108 to 62. When the final meager relief funds were expended, work on the canal ceased.
In the final political analysis, job creation during the nation's
worst depression served the canal's friends little better than had any
of the earlier defenses of it. The powerful intervention of Senator
Fletcher moved the canal further than ever before, but Ickes' opp*
sition, Rooaevelt's ambivalence, and the senator's mortality combined to defeat the effort. The decade of the 1930s ended as it had
begun, with quiet tranquility along what was left of the pristine
Ocklawaha.
Like the legendary phoenix, however, the canal refused to stay
dead. In fact, it proved to have more lives - and its defenders
more rationales - than a Jacksonville alley cat on steroids.
During the early to mid 1930s, three powerful elements had
conspired to drive the canal forward: the predominant economic
interests of some of the state's most powerN leaders; an influential
politician with access to resources; and a responsive national
administration. After 1936, this constellation of interests dissipated. Fletcher died. South Florida outstripped north Florida in p o p
ulation, economic clout, and political influence; after 1936
conservative Democrats allied with Republicans to checkmate the
New Deal. Influential Michigan Republican Senator Arthur H.
Vandenberg became an effective critic of New Deal waste and environmental destruction. In Florida, racial change during the 1960s
and 19'70s further divided the Democratic party and opened the
way to major gains by Republicans. Whereas the Democratic party
earlier had waged intramural war over the canal based on regional
and economic differences, Republicans were free to troll in the
vote-rich waters for new targets of opportunity upset by both
Democratic positions on the canal: national party footdragging on
one side and local environmental opposition on the other.
The beginning of the Second World War brought a brief
renaval of interest in the canal, this time because of military and
strategic concerns. German U-boats prowled Gulf and Atlantic
waters searching for easy maritime targets. So inJuly 1942 Congress
authorized construction of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, though
it appropriated no money to implement the project. A proposal to
use locks and dams to prevent salt contamination of the water sup
ply mitigated some south Florida opposition, but by the end of the
war, the project remained pretty much where it had been at the end
of 1936: unfunded and generally forgotten.
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e co war of the 1950s and 1960s with consequent develop
ment of the space program and its launching facilities at Cape
Canaveral provided yet another rationale for canal construction.
Rocket engine components departed Huntsville on barges that
moved along the Tennessee River system to the Ohio, down the
Mississippi to the Gulf,thence along the Gulf coast and around the
Florida peninsula to the launch site. A crowFlorida canal could
reduce the journey by hundreds of miles. By the 1960s, a friendly
Democratic administration preoccupied with Florida's pivotal g e e
graphical position vis-a-vis Cuba occupied the White House. Once
more a powerful Florida Democratic senator held court in
Washington. PresidentJohn F. Kennedy struck a deal with Senator
George A. Smathers to renew canal construction. Privately,
Kennedy considered the canal a piece of pork dangled before powerful Florida Democrats. Publicly he defended the project as a
boost to the state's economy and the nation's defense.I5
Problem was the Army Corps of Engineers' calculations challenged the canal's economic feasibility. This minor hitch was
quickly overcome by yet another Corps recalculation which added
the benefit of "land enhancement" to the economic value of the
With the problem of economic feasibility thus resolved,
President Lyndon B. Johnson traveled to Palatka for the second
groundbreaking in 1964. This one went better than the first had in
1935. A special remote hookup had allowed Roosevelt to explode
the first charge of dynamite at the construction site. But Roosevelt
hit the button prematurely, detonating the deafening explosion
during a speech by the canal's most enthusiastic proponent. LBJ
took no chances of a repeat, firing the charge on site and on cue
(although preparations for the blast turned into theater when
workers packed the explosion site with enough peat moss to create
a satisfying spectacle for onlookers).
After a 30-year hiatus, contractors were now back at work creating mountainous piles of dirt as new machines called crushercrawlers flattened thousands of cypress trees along the Ocklawaha.
The new Rodman Dam slowly backed up the river into a sixteen
Lake.
15. Craig Pittman, "Digging Ourselves into a Hole," St. Petersburg Times,
October 31, 1999.
16. Ibict.
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Destiny finally seemed to favor the buildezs, boosters, develop
en, power brokers, and prwanal politicians. That is until the
appearance of Marjorie Harris Carr, a housewife, environmental
activist, and wife of field biologist Archie Carr of the University of
Florida. Carr described her first trip on the Ocklawaha as a 'dreamlike"journey down a 'canopy river," "spring-fed and swift." 'Here,
by Cod," she vowed later, "was a piece of Florida, a lovely nahual
area right in my back yard, that was being threatened for no good
reason."17
In some respects Carr's standing up that day was as significant
to Florida's modern environmental movement as Rosa Parks' sitting down on a Montgomery bus was to Alabama's modem Civil
Rights Movement Mobilized by Carr, environmental groups began
to challenge canal construction. At first sneered at, snubbed, and
largely ignored by state and federal officials, who accused them of
blocking Florida's economic development for the sake of worthless
scrub and palmetto, they turned to the courts. In 1969 the
Environmental Defense Fundjoined others in filing suit in the U.S.
Court for the District of Cdumbia seeking an injunction against
construction of the canal. On January 15,1971, the District Court
granted a preliminary injunction halting brther construction.
Four days later, President Richard M. Nixon signed an executive
order suspending further work on the barge canal, effectively ending the project.
This last phase in the slow demise of the canal involved a
Nixonian equivalent to Harold Ickes. Russell E. Train, a presidential aide, examined a number of Corps of Engineers projects and
found many of them flawed by high construction costs and adverse
environmental effects. As a result, Train recommended freezing
funding for the canal. The C o r p s and the entire Florida congressional delegation opposed Train's recommendation.
But Republican Governor Claude R Kirk, Jr. supported Train.
Engaged in nearly dady battles with his all-Democratic cabinet and
a majority Democratic legislature, Kirk used unconventional strategy to keep his opponents off balance.18 One example of his maverick streak involved his environmental interests. Although from
Jacksonville, he connected not to that city's historic interest groups
that favored the canal but to the city's growing conservatism, both
17. Ibid
18. Tebeau, p. 447.
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racial and political, in which ideology trumped pork. Whether
opportunistically sensing the growing grassroots support for
Marjorie Carr and her environmental crusade, or a convert to it
himself, Kirk made clear to President Nixon how he felt about the
canal. Among Democrats, Lawton M. Chiles,Jr. spread discontent
with the canal during his 19'70 senatorial walking tour across
Florida.
Meanwhile, Marjorie Carr's relentless campaign gained traction. The same year that Kirk and Chiles mobilized opposition
among Florida voters, Reader's Digat reached a broader audience
with a negative essay about the canal. Even S$~orts1Uustrated p u b
lished an article trashing the project.
Perhaps President Nixon should be given no more credit for
opposition to the canal than FDR should be given blame for his
support. As with Roosevelt, Nixon's position reflected more concern about the convoluted terrain of American politics than the
undulating course of the Ocklawaha. Four months after his pas
sionate defense of Florida's "natural treasure" (the Ocklawaha,
which, incidentally, was misspelled in his statement), Nixon dedicated the Tenn-Tom Canal, on the Tombigbee River between
Alabama and ~ississippi.'~That project, sponsored by Alabama
Congressman Tom Bevill, the pork king of another era of American
politics and a powerful committee chairman of a still Democratic
House of Representatives, involved many of the same issues as the
Florida canal, cost much more to build than Corps of Enginegg,&mates, and never realized the predicted tlaffic or revenue. ~ f i - 4 ' k
When halted, the trans-Florida canal was one-third complete
and had cost taxpayers $74 million.
In May 1990 U.S. Senators Bob Graham and Connie Mack one a Democrat, the other a Republican - filed a bill providing
for a 300 yard wide greenway corridor to be maintained along the
former barge route. Demonstrating the shifting sands of maritime
politics, the Florida congressional delegation this time unanimously endorsed the bill. The Florida legislature confirmed this
Congressional decision on May 31 of that year. On November 28
President George Bush signed a law deauthorizing the cross-Florida
canal and changing the nature of the now hakentury-long project
*

19. For Nixon's cancellation statement, see "Statement About Halting
Construction of the Cross Florida Barge Canal,"January 19, 1971, The
American Presidency Project.
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to recreation and conservation. Florida's governor concurred on
January 22, 1991. To complete the ironic transformation of the
"Big Ditch," the Cross Florida Greenway was officially renamed the
Marjorie Hams Carr Cross Florida Greenway in 1998 in honor of
the woman who spent much of her adult life opposing the canal.
She did not live to receive the accolades for her efforts. Carr died
one year before the rechristening of the route.*O The 10'7mile long
pristine greenway now welcomes hikers, bikers, bird watchers, fishermen, and other nature enthusiasts.
So, what lessons can we learn from this instructive Florida
story? In democratic America, the fate of mountains, rivers, forests,
deltas, swamplands, bird and fish species, pristine coastlines and
coral reefs, prized fishing grounds and rich animal habitat, all
reside in democratic debate and are often determined by the quality of leadership within each interest group. The public need not
concede the issue of natural domain exclusively to people who own
the land and seek the highest profit from it, or the right of one special interest group against another to decide the use of national
resources for generations still unborn.
Perhaps it would be better if there were some intrinsic, universally recognized value to the features of the natural world. But until
such value can be agreed upon, we are relegated to deciding these
issues within the messy, conflicted, flawed world of politics. Within
that world, the fate of Florida's "big ditchn is one of the environmental movement's most instructive sagas.
r !) Oh, one final word. Never think for a moment that politicians,
corporate executives, and powerfid special interests always win such
contentious battles. It would be simplistic to conclude that the fate
of the cross-Florida canal was ultimately determined by Marjorie
Harris Carr. But if not for her, the outcome would certainly have
been measurably dBerent. Her story reminds even cynics that in
America the life of one person really can make a difference.

20. My chronology of the canal comes from "Marjorie Harris Carr Cross Florida
Greenway - History,* Florida Department of Environmental Protection.
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